

CONGRESS OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF ERITREANS IN GERMANY



The National Committee of Eritreans in Germany conducted its third congress on 22 April in Frankfurt.

The congress was attended by representatives of the national committee from 26 cities in Germany.

Mr. Kahsai Tewolde, Head of Public and Community Affairs at the Eritrean Embassy in Germany, said that the new stage that we are entering requires strong organizational capacity and commitment and

expressed expectation that the congress under the umbrella of the national committee will design viable action plan and diligently work for its implementation.

Mr. Musie Fisehaye, secretary of the national committee, presented activity report in terms of achievements registered and challenges encountered and the participants conducted extensive discussion on the report presented.

The participants also adopted

the constitution of the national committee and elected new executive committee.

Commending all those that contributed in the successful implementation of the charted out program of the national committee, Mr. Kibreab Tekeste, Eritrea's Consul General in Frankfurt, expressed good wish to the newly elected executive committee.

INDEPENDENCE CUP TOURING THE SOUTHERN RED SEA REGION

After completing its tour in the Northern Red Sea region, the Independence Cup has commenced its journey in the Southern Red Sea region from the town of Tio on 30 April. The Independence Cup has toured the trenches in Duhtoum, Rehaita, Ras-Dumera and the port city of Assab accompanied by Ambassador Mohammed-Seid Mantai, Governor of the region, the Sultan of Rehaita Abdulkadir Dawud, Mr. Rezene Michael, Head of PFDJ in the region, and Mr. Ali Nur Ali, chairman of the regional Assembly.

During its tour in the historical areas, the Independence Cup was accorded warm welcome by the local inhabitants and members of the Defense Forces featuring military parades as well as cultural and artistic performances.

In a welcoming ceremony organized at the Duhtoum trenches, Ambassador Mohammed-Seid Mantai said that Eritrea's history is a testimony to the people's unwavering fortitude and that the heroic feat demonstrated at the trenches of Duhtoum attests to the transfer of Martyrs Trust to generations.



ERITREAN COMMUNITY MEETING IN SOUTH-EASTERN USA



Representatives of the Eritrean community in the Southeastern United States conducted their annual activity assessment meeting in the city of Jacksonville, Florida, on 29 April.

The meeting was attended by representatives of the PFDJ, the National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students, the National Union of Eritrean Women as well as YPFDJ offices from the cities of Atlanta, Charlotte, Miami, Orlando, Jacksonville and Nashville.

At the meeting in which Mr. Berhane Gebrehiwet, Charge d'Affairs of the Eritrean Embassy in the US, and Ms. Hadned Keleta, Head of Public and Community Affairs at the embassy, took part, activity reports were presented by the heads of the organizations and the participants conducted extensive discussion on the reports presented.

The participants contributed over 100 thousand dollars and expressed readiness to strengthen participation in the national affairs.

Mr. Berhane also gave a seminar to the participants focusing on the objective situation in the homeland as well as on the significance of strengthening organizational capacity.

MEETING ON EXPANDING PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

A meeting with a view to expand public organizations was organized in the Swedish city of Nykoping on 30 April.

At the meeting in which over 200 community representatives as well as national organizations and associations took part, Mr. Sirak Bahlibi, Head of Public and Community Affairs at the Eritrean Embassy, pointed out that strong organization is the basis for a strong community, strong leadership and strong nationalism. He added that efforts are being made to expand and strengthen

public organizations.

Ms. Saba Tekle, chairwoman of the National Union of Eritrean Women branch, on her part said that reinforced effort will be carried out to recruit young women that are willing to work for the realization of the objectives and mission of the union.

Underlining that an active organization with clear mission will always emerge victorious, Mr. Amanuel Mengistu, chairman of the PFDJ organization, called for strengthening organizational capacity and participation in the

national affairs.

Mr. Filmon Teklai, head of the National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students, also called for strengthening participation of all stakeholders in the effort to transfer the noble societal values to the young generation.

Likewise, Mr. Negassi Kassa, Eritrea's Ambassador to the European Union and Benelux countries, gave seminar to the participants focusing on the significance of strengthening organization in the nation building process.



Interview with President Isaias Afwerki

As it may be recalled, local media had conducted an extensive, four-part, interview with President Isaias Afwerki on domestic and international issues during the months of February and March 2023. The current interview deals with, and is focused on, the dynamics, ramifications and future trajectory of the conflict in the Sudan.

Question: *The Al-Bashir regime had posed a considerable security threat to the region at large, and neighboring countries, including Eritrea, in particular, on account of its fundamentalist religious agenda. Its subsequent ouster from power in 2019 due to the wrath of the Sudanese people gave rise to an atmosphere of hope and optimism in the Sudan as well as the region. The new reality ushered in a restoration and enhancement of bilateral ties between Eritrea and Sudan that was reflected in continuous diplomatic shuttles and consultations. Taking into consideration the legacy of the Al-Bashir regime, what are the causes and defining features of the unnecessary conflict that has engulfed the Sudan at the present time*

In view of Sudan's geostrategic importance in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and beyond, the developments that have unfolded in the Sudan cannot be underestimated or taken lightly. The post-2019 era is characterized by specific dynamics that raise questions about its genesis and development. But, it must also be examined within its historical context; from whence it came and how it unfolded.

The principal challenge for all peoples, whether in the Sudan or in any other underdeveloped country, is nation-building with its different dimensions; specifically, its socio-economic, cultural, and security aspects. Any discussion of the current situation must accordingly begin with examining its origins. If the aim is indeed to bring a lasting solution, stability, peace, growth, and development, then the root challenges must first be solved.

The period from Sudan's independence in 1956 until 2019 can be roughly divided into three stages; the Al-Azhari period (1956-1969); the Nimeiri years (1969-1989); and the National Congress Party or Islamic Revolution (1989-2019) regime. Relative to other African countries, the Sudan occupied a more developed status – by all measures – during the first two stages. The nation-building process was quite advanced in these phases. This was especially true in the first 20 years of the Numeiri period in which the process gained acceleration and was moving in a positive direction. This does not mean it was completely free of challenges. There were the problems of the South and other regions. Nevertheless, the process was progressing well in spite of these challenges.

In 1989, however, Political Islam, which technically began in 1983 during the last years of Numeiri's rule, took center stage. This Islamic movement, spearheaded by the Muslim Brotherhood (al-aKhwan al-Muslimin), was a continuation of what was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. But throughout the decades, it failed to make any discernible influence within the ranks of the Sudanese people. Political movements based on this philosophy did not have any influence that exceeded 4 or 5 percent of the population. In 1983, however, owing to the general conditions of the Cold War, this movement began to readjust its position, alongside various other parties.

I will not delve into all the myriad details. Suffice it to say that beginning in 1983, the Islamists expanded their murky network in the subsequent six

years and seized power in 1989 through a coup. Once they usurped power, they began to derail the nation-building process. This in turn triggered unprecedented protests throughout the country – in the south, west, and east. The eventual legacy of the NCP/NIF regime was the eventual fragmentation of the Sudan; the most significant of which was the issue of South Sudan.

Internal developments were

in 2019, the country stood at a crossroads. It needed to move away from the 30-years-long NCP regime to a new rule. The path was clear: move away from the fallen regime towards a



pushed and goaded. But they were pushed and relegated to ultimately opt for secession in 2011. At the same time, the protests in the West and East did not subside. The situation in the South itself was not over. There are still unresolved issues such as Abyei and others. Disputes on whether there should, or should not be, oil allocation remain. Similarly, the Darfur problem continues; same with Kurdufan and the Blue Nile – none of these have been resolved until yesterday.

The Sudan, with all its resources, is considered as the breadbasket of the region. The country's current situation, however, shows otherwise; its economy has been embezzled; it is drowning in debt; and the economic difficulties of its population have worsened. The past thirty years have thus halted the relative progress in nation-building of the preceding period to entail fragmentation of the country.

The worsening economic and security situation and the deterioration in livelihood caused bitterness amongst the population. This resulted in spontaneous and powerful revolts. This eventually led to the overthrow of the regime in 2019. The popular revolts were not led or directed by any particular entity. But although the people may not have articulated their wishes through a written manifesto, the message was clear and unequivocal: "we have had enough".

When the regime was overthrown by a popular uprising

transitional stage and then from a transitional stage towards a gate of safety (or a new and healthy political dispensation). This is the shortest and easiest route. To enter the gate of safety, it would have been necessary to install a new system of government by gleaning key lessons from the accumulated experience. In turn, the new system of government, acceptable to the Sudanese people, would have enabled the country to cross the gate towards safety. Unfortunately, the path deviated and was derailed from this route.

The post-2019 period was littered with what I refer to as "distortions". Different groups began to claim the revolution as exclusively their own; to claim to have brought about radical change for the people and country on their own. A spontaneous popular revolt, which happened in response to dire internal developments after years of unresolved grievances and patience, was now being claimed as the project of one group or another. Some began to claim "I'm the revolution", "we did this". Different groups began to sprout from all corners. The country had never witnessed such confusion. The question remained; how can you claim to have brought about the change that the population itself brought about spontaneously? And if you are going to say that you have contributed in any way, now is not the time.

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Interview with President Isaias Afwerki

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Similarly, if you are going to contest power, now is not the time. Once you have crossed the critical stage where you have secured stability, then you can talk about, or envisage, competition for power. This is a transitional period and there is no reason to contest power during this period. It is also not the time to divide people along military and civilian lines. This is a transitional stage brought about by a popular uprising. Its roadmap is clear. The key goal at this time is to design the bridge that can take you across to the gate leading towards safety. How do you get there should be the leading question?

For the Sudan to reach the gates of safety, a new situation must be in place. This new situation will be crystallized in a new system of government which must be chosen and elected by the people. This is the debate that began during the first month of the first year. The distortion of the main process or direction had led to a wrong outcome or inclusion in the case of South Sudan and associated instability.

As stressed earlier, it is counterproductive to fight over ownership of the revolution at this point in time. This is not the time for settling scores or squabbling about power. This is a transitional phase and these divisive trends must not be contemplated. They may arise once the destination is reached.

The war between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is a legacy of the NCP's attempt to build its own army and create security institutions in its own image over the past 30 years. What does the Sudanese army really look like? What do the country's security institutions look like? How were they established? Much can be said about all of these. What is the difference between the RSF and the SAF? Both belonged to the same regime – they were created from it. One can raise a number of issues regarding the structure of the former Sudanese Armed Force; both in respect to political and ideological tendencies. But this is not the time to do so. Furthermore, there are armed groups in Darfur, Kurdufan, Blue Nile and the East that have not been incorporated into the process. In the event, the building of a national, sovereign defense institution has its own

process whose crystallization will require a long time. There is no reason to presume that it has a direct linkage with the transition process in question and that it must be resolved first.

One of the disruptions raised in recent times was the issue of integration of the army. The demand was for the RSF to integrate its forces with the army. This should not be controversial in principle. The question of a unitary army is not controversial or a matter that must be glossed over. But it does not have to be implemented in haste now, tomorrow or after tomorrow. Implementation must be carried out through meticulous preparations. For purposes of emphasis and clarity, it must be underlined that in principle and as a Sovereign State, Sudan must have a unitary defense institution.

How this is built is another process that should not be conflated with what we call the transitional phase. Raising this matter will only be seen as a pretext or distraction. Indeed, it cannot be established prior to the formation of a civilian government. The formation of a civilian government is in fact a significant topic in and by itself. One has to reach a satisfactory answer on this topic first. To say that military unification must occur prior to the establishment of a civilian government may be tantamount to putting the cart before the horse. Where will this then lead?

How does the issue of military integration morph into a cause for conflict? And what is the actual reason for conflict? What does a power struggle between two individuals mean in this context? As we have seen over the past 30 years, when substantive issues are mishandled, they result in meaningless conflicts and complications. This is inexcusable. As I mentioned earlier, there is no force other than the army as a whole (as an impartial force) that can shoulder the burden of the transition process towards the gates of safety. That is why we as neighbors, as partners, maintained our direct relationship and all our consultations with Burhan. Not because this is his own personal issue, but because, at this particular stage, the national army is the body that can move the country towards the gates of safety; because it is an impartial force; and because it is deemed as capable of guaranteeing the safety and stability of the country.



Why did this war break out? What is the reason for the conflict? Is it a conflict between civilians and the military? Is it a conflict within the army? Where did the conflict originate to cause such destruction? With what arguments can you justify any of it?

At any rate, it must be reiterated that the transitional phase must remain in the hands of the army. It cannot be replaced. Anyone watching from the outside, as we are watching the developments closely as neighbors, cannot inject arbitrary parameters or qualifications of capacity and/or age for preference of one against the other. The crucial thing is that the army must shoulder the burden of the transitional stage and steer the process to reach the gates of safety. It must then hand-over power to the Sudanese population who will subsequently establish its own institutions of governance.

To dwell on the consequences of the war will only compound and eclipse the quest for a lasting solution. One must understand the conflict's historical genesis and the sequence of events that led to it. The media tends to focus and exaggerate the consequences. This will only add fuel to the fire.

The approach must be reversed. War must stop – without any debate or equivocation. The actual causes that led to the conflict must be properly identified to prevent any recurrence of such a tragic situation in the future. In a nutshell, the underlying problem must be resolved. And all of us have to work on this.

Sudan's neighbors are the countries that are most affected by the unfolding events. It is accordingly imperative for the countries of the region to work in partnership and to hold consultations on the resolution of these problems as was indeed the case in the past with the problem of South Sudan. But

most importantly, the central role will invariably be played by the Sudanese people. This must be accepted as an operational principle. Within this framework, the most urgent task at this point in time is to bring an immediate end to the war. After ensuring a permanent end to the war, all the complications that triggered the conflict must be addressed and removed. The transitional phase must subsequently be allowed to progress unhindered and move the country towards the gates of safety.

Question: *For obvious historical and geographical reasons, Eritrea is one of the neighboring countries that is closely and directly affected by the situation in Sudan. In addition to bolstering warm bilateral ties, Eritrea has been playing a modest role, in a discreet manner, in the promotion of the objectives of the transitional phase and beyond, especially in view of its good ties with all Sudanese political forces. Eritrea's role stems from its conviction on the neutrality of the Armed forces and the need for a participatory transitional political phase. In this respect, what is Eritrea's stance and outlook on a lasting solution to the conflict and, more generally, on the peaceful political peace process in the Sudan?*

What I have discussed so far, in very broad terms, can be viewed as setting the historical context and the backdrop to the current events. As far as we are concerned, our commitment to the Sudanese cause is not anchored on a random whim or mood. Eritrea's profound relations with the Sudan does not require a novel explanation because the memories are still fresh from our recent history. The extent to which developments in the Sudan over the past 30 years affected us is a well-known fact. So, our engagement with the cause of the

Sudanese people is not optional or a matter of choice. Stability, peace and development in the Sudan are shared and common interests for both of our peoples. As such, there is no reason why we should not contribute to the extent that we can in this endeavor. This does not detract from the fact that the issue of the Sudan is first and foremost the responsibility of the Sudanese people.

In general, the stability of other countries in our neighborhood is not optional and a matter of choice. Regional stability is vital because it reinforces domestic stability; makes it reliable and ensures sustainability. One cannot walk away from it. As such, when the popular uprising happened in 2019, our engagement became stronger as required by the circumstances. We did not choose to remain on the sidelines and "pass the buck" to others. We carefully analyzed the evolving situation and assessed the prospects of acting positively? How can we demonstrate our friendship to the people of the Sudan in their hour of difficulty?

Taking stock of all of the turbulent winds, no one could afford to ignore the potential consequences of the preoccupying developments in the Sudan with its ramifications both inside the country but also in the region as a whole. The news that was being churned out was unsettling... "Nubians have been killed in eastern Sudan", "killings took place in the Blue Nile region", "villages have been set on fire in Darfur," etc. This cannot but engender concern in the neighborhood.

After 30 years of oppression, the betrayal of the Sudanese people has given rise to this current point. The country has embarked on a transitional phase towards a better future.

For us, the modest role that we can play must be predicated on a clear strategy of engagement. The primary concern was some discernible negative trends that could derail the process. These emanated mostly from opportunistic movements that seemed bent on sowing discord within the transition process.

As it will be recalled, the Sudanese army chose to stand by the people during the popular uprising in 2019. It refused orders to "arrest" and "kill".

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SpotLight

Chronology of unfriendly policies and acts pursued by previous US Administrations

(Annex 1)

1. The profound misunderstanding that characterizes US-Eritrean ties does not emanate, as is often insinuated, from substantive differences on events surrounding the war in Somalia in 2006. It predates this singular episode.

2. Indeed, since the 1950s when overriding US strategic interests compromised Eritrea's right of decolonization, successive US Administrations have invariably propped up Ethiopian colonial presence in Eritrea. US principal responsibility in stifling Eritrea's right of decolonization in the 1950s to promote its global strategic interests with the advent of the Cold War; its huge military support, including the training of local "counter-insurgency forces" to the Imperial Haile Selassie regime; its less prominent support to the Mengistu regime in spite of the latter's undeniable alliance with the Soviet Union; and its opposition, until the 11th hour, to Eritrea's legitimate struggle for liberation are indeed matters of indisputable historical record.

3. The human and opportunity costs that these policies entailed to the Eritrean people, who had to pay the huge price of more than 65,000 deaths in combat of their best sons and daughters, is too evident to merit emphasis.

4. Following liberation, the Government of Eritrea chose to forgive and forget, to close the dark chapter, and, to begin on a new slate by fostering a new relationship of cooperation and friendship. This was reciprocated by the US Administrations and bilateral relations were good until 1998.

5. However, when Ethiopia declared war against Eritrea on 14 May 1998, and as Ethiopian jet fighters attacked Eritrea's capital, Asmara, on 5 June 1998, the then US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa broke diplomatic precedence to directly address the OAU Summit in Ouagadougou in support of Ethiopia and to lobby the OAU to adopt a resolution against Eritrea.

6. In July the same year, President Clinton brokered a Moratorium on Air Strikes between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Eritrea's declared preference was for a comprehensive secession of hostilities. But the Clinton Administration insisted on a partial arrangement arguing that Ethiopia

was not prepared to contemplate a comprehensive truce. Ethiopia abused the window of peace to purchase SU-27 jet fighters, mostly with Western financial support. And on 6 February 1999, it launched a new military offensive against Eritrea by fabricating "Eritrea's air bombardment of Adi Grat", a town in northern Ethiopia. The US authorities were fully aware of, and ascertained without a shred of doubt, Ethiopia's bogus justification and its flagrant breach of the Moratorium on Air Strikes. Still, they abstained from taking appropriate remedial action.

7. The United States nonetheless continued to "facilitate" the peace talks in conjunction with the European Union and the OAU. In the course of the tortuous negotiating process, the US "Facilitators" came up, in September 1999, with a detailed final document known as the "Technical Arrangements". This Agreement was submitted to the parties as a "take it or leave it" package. Both parties accepted the document and pledged to be bound by its provisions. Soon after, Eritrea learned that Ethiopia had not accepted the Agreement in good faith and was only biding time to launch another war. Subsequently, Eritrea's Head of State conveyed this information to the highest authorities in Washington who reassured Eritrea that Ethiopia would face severe consequences should this turn out to be the case. As it happened, Ethiopia declared the peace process in "terminal phase" and launched the third offensive on 12 May 2000. The US Administration backtracked on its commitments and only nudged the UN Security Council to impose military sanctions on both the guilty and aggrieved parties.

8. The US also extended both directly and mostly through convenient proxies, military support to Ethiopia during the war. Although the Government of Eritrea has not to date disclosed fully the information at its disposal, US intelligence agencies were further embroiled, at the height of Ethiopia's third offensive in May 2000, in instigating acts of sedition and treason, including attempted liaison with Ethiopia, within a small ring of senior government officials.

9. In 2001, Eritrean diplomats in Washington were deprived of

their diplomatic privileges on tax exemption in contravention of the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Eritrea did not take reciprocal action and US diplomats continue to enjoy their tax exemption privileges.

10. In June 2003, Eritrea was omitted from the list of East African countries slated to receive US funding for counter-terrorism barely three months after its inclusion, and while at the same time retaining Eritrea's membership, in the "Coalition of the Willing".

11. In October 2003, a visiting military team of the US Task Force based in Djibouti (CJTF-HOA) assisted the unlawful departure of an Eritrean citizen to Djibouti aboard its Helicopter in violation of the domestic laws of the country.

12. In 2003, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) published its annual religious freedom report accusing the Government of Eritrea for "violation of religious freedom". In February 2004, the US Administration designated Eritrea a "country of particular concern" and imposed sanctions on military sales.

13. In December 2003, President Bush announced the cancellation of Eritrea's membership to AGOA, barely two years after its inclusion.

14. Since 2004, the US has continued to reject the right of, and expressed request by, Eritrea to purchase property in New York for the residence of its permanent representative to the United Nations.

15. On 13 April 2004, US Homeland Officers raided the Eritrean Community Centre in Washington D.C. and confiscated money and documents forcefully from the Eritrean diplomatic agent at gunpoint. In spite of Eritrea's repeated requests and in violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the US government continues to refuse returning the Embassy property.

16. In September 2004, Eritrea's Minister of Foreign Affairs was strip-searched by US Security

officers at the airport in New York. 17. At various times since 2003, the US embassy in Asmara intentionally delayed or refused to issue entry visas for numerous Eritrean senior government officials who sought to leave for the USA for official business. Officials denied visas include senior Government Ministers, PFDJ officials and even musical groups for concerts at festivals of Eritrean communities in the US.

18. In January 2006, the US Assistant Secretary of State visited the occupied Eritrean town of Badme through Ethiopia and without the knowledge and authorization of Eritrea. In doing so, Ms. Frazer not only sanctioned Ethiopia's occupation of a sovereign Eritrean town, but to add insult to injury, she proposed that a "referendum" be held to decide the future of "Badme".

19. In November 2006, the US Ambassador to Eritrea demanded that the Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare pay 4.5 million US dollars for food aid donated to the needy by two NGOs (Mercy Corps and Catholic Relief Services) and that was utilized in accordance with the food-monetization policy. Similarly, the US Administration had previously demanded that Eritrea pay for food aid destined to Ethiopia and that perished in the Port of Assab in 1998 when the regime in Addis Abeba declared war and boycotted the port.

20. In November 2006, US authorities imposed travel restrictions on Eritrean embassy members and their dependents in Washington and Oakland. Ever since, State Department officials almost routinely reject most of the travel requests by (the Ambassador and) other Eritrean diplomats beyond the 25 km limit.

21. Although the Eritrean Government issued the requested visa to the US Embassy's new Visa Officer in Asmara, the US embassy nonetheless informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November 2006 that "effective December 4, 2006, non-immigrant visa services will be temporarily suspended due to staffing shortages. Non-immigrant visa services will resume as soon

as staff are granted permission to travel to Eritrea to provide this service". This notice, that was posted in Website the same day, remains effective until today and Eritreans who wish to visit their relatives in the US have to travel to Nairobi or Cairo to apply for entry visas which is not always granted.

22. In July 2006, Eritrea's new Ambassador to the US was warned that "he will have a hard time during his tenure in Washington" during a courtesy call to US Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

23. In January 2007, US security officers at New York's JFK airport conducted unlawful search on the person of Eritrea's Ambassador to the United Nations. The Ambassador was isolated from the other passengers and ordered to pass through a special search machine. His hand luggage was searched in a special spot, disregarding his Diplomatic Identification Card. The security officer in charge informed the Ambassador that the special search was an order from higher authorities. Furthermore, upon arrival in Asmara, the Ambassador discovered that his baggage was forcefully opened and searched, without his approval and presence. A "Notice of Inspection" was inserted inside his baggage in acknowledgment of the act. This is in violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which clearly states: "Inspection shall be conducted in the presence of the Diplomatic Agent or of his authorized representative".

24. In February 2007, the US Embassy in Asmara wrote in Note Verbale No. 046/07: "The embassy wishes to inform the Government of the State of Eritrea that its continued failure to allow the unhindered entry of our diplomatic pouches, which contain items necessary for the full functioning of the mission, including materials vital to the issuance of the visas, has unduly interfered with Embassy operations. Unless we are able to resolve this matter, effective February 14, the Embassy of the United States will close to the public and suspend all visa operations".

25. In February 2007, US visa revalidation office in the State Department delayed the renewal of visa of the Deputy of Chief of Mission (DCM) in the Eritrean Embassy in Washington under the flimsy excuse of "administrative review" process.

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Chronology of unfriendly policies . . .

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26. In May 2007, the US Embassy in Asmara informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the HIV/AIDS prevention programme will be terminated on 31 May 2007. The termination of the programme, which was incidentally very small compared to other countries in Africa, was again justified by the spurious pretext of permission obstacles to inspection trips.

27. In June 2009, President Obama signed Executive Order 1349 putting Eritrea in the league of “human trafficking” nations and imposing a series of financial sanctions against it. In reality, it was US Administrations that were willfully engaged in inducing human flight from Eritrea for reasons better known to them. In 2004, the US Government employed the services of the UNHCR to encourage the entire Kunama language group in Eritrea to seek and obtain asylum in the United States. Again in February 2009, the Bureau of Refugees in the State Department announced that it has allocated asylum rights for 10,000 Eritrean youth who may desert the National Service. (This act in fact violates US laws against army deserters as well as undermining the elaborate extradition proceedings that the Pentagon routinely resorts to so as to bring to court US army deserters from Iraq and other war zones who seek asylum in third countries).

28. The Obama Administration continued until the end of its term the annual and offensive ritual of designating Eritrea as “a Country of Concern for practicing religious persecution”. 29. Unlawful Interference in the Boundary Demarcation Process

29. The US Administration acted unlawfully to obstruct the demarcation of the boundary in accordance with the “final and binding” decisions of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). When Ethiopia’s Prime Minister rejected, in September 2003, the EEBC Award as “illegal, irresponsible and unjust” and requested the UN Security Council to create an “alternative mechanism”, this was done in consultation and with the approval of the US Administration. The appointment of Lloyd Axworthy and the subsequent decision of the US Government to appoint General Fulford are, among other things, clear testimonies to the collusion between the United States and Ethiopia to alter the colonial boundary by circumventing the EEBC. 30. Indeed, General Fulford,

rather unwisely, wrote to Eritrea’s Legal Counsel that he was seeking operational latitude to shift the boundary by about 1 km. In her press statement in May 2007, the Assistant Secretary of State crowed about “satellite technology” to address the issues of “some farms that would be split from their wells”. It must be underlined that there are no “mosques” or “churches” that will be split into two. We are talking about a 1000 km borderline with no “nightmarish” scenarios. But above all, the litigation process was exhaustive and conducted over a two-year period with the submission of voluminous memorials, counter-memorials, and, hearings where all issues were argued out and trashed. In any case, if US official position is the implementation of the “final and binding” Award of the EEBC decision without any qualification, in accordance with the Algiers Agreement, the stance of the Assistant Secretary of State is at variance with her government’s views.

31. Ambassador John Bolton, former US Permanent Representative to the UN, in his book ‘Surrender is not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations’ notes, in regard to the border issue between Eritrea and Ethiopia: “I certainly had no favourite, but it seemed that Eritrea had a point. Ethiopia had agreed on a mechanism to resolve the border dispute in 2000 and now was welching on its deal in flat violation of its commitments...I said we should solve the problem and not let it fester forever, France, Japan and several other Council members agreed with me... For reasons I never understood, however, Frazer reversed course, and asked in early February to reopen the 2002 EEBC decision, which she had concluded was wrong, and award a major piece of disputed territory to Ethiopia. I was at a loss how to explain that to the Security Council...”

32. On a similar issue, Mr. Azouz Ennifar, former Acting Special Representative of the UNSG to Eritrea and Ethiopia reported: “I met on 24 June 2006 with Jendayi Frazer, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in Addis Ababa. She regretted that the EEBC is not flexible. She told me that she has developed parallel tracks to deal with the matter. In her view, demarcation as Eritrea wants it is not feasible. She also said that the status quo would benefit Ethiopia and demarcation would not take place without dialogue”. U.S. Embassy Berlin cable of 11 August 2009, similarly, reads: “We agreed that Ethiopia is an ‘indispensable partner’ to stability in the region, the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is ‘frozen’ for the foreseeable future;”

33. The United States has been instrumental in ensuring that UN Security Council Resolutions are distorted to apportion equal blame to Eritrea and Ethiopia. At times, the US has even succeeded in portraying Eritrea as the culprit party. Ethiopia has rejected the EEBC decision which should have been enforced by the UN Security Council. Yet to date, Ethiopia continues to occupy sovereign Eritrean territories in violation of the Algiers Peace Agreement, the Charter of the UN, as well as UN Security Council Resolutions, adopted in 2002 requesting Ethiopia to dismantle settlements in the Badme area. All these issues have “faded with time” and US leverage is being brought to bear on the UN Security Council so as to misdirect its punitive measures against Eritrea. In a confidential cable communication from the US Secretary of State issued on March 1st 2008, the US mission to the UN is instructed to canvass for support from certain Security Council members and UN troop-contributing countries for sanctions against Eritrea “for its interference with UNMEE, especially its recent refusal to reinstate fuel supplies to the Mission”. The cable states: “Potential options include, i) imposing a travel ban on key Eritrean government officials; ii) placing an assets freeze on these same officials and/or other Eritrean assets/resources; iii) imposing trade, investment, or other restrictions related to Eritrean resources, including mining; iv) imposing an arms embargo on Eritrea”.

1. US role in exacerbating the conflict with Djibouti

34. The United States and Ethiopia colluded to nudge Djibouti to fabricate a border dispute and falsely accuse Eritrea “for military aggression against its small neighbor.” Indeed, Djibouti-Eritrea relations were improving steadily even as the situation in Somalia was taking a turn for the worse in 2006. A 14 September 2006 cable from the Embassy of France reports on a September 7-8 meetings with U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti W. Stuart Symington and French officials, (Helene Le Gal and desk officer Francois Gautier; President Chirac’s Africa Advisor Michel de Bonnacorse; and his deputy Jacques Champagne de Labriolle). According to the cable: “...Djibouti had managed to maintain a balanced relationship with Ethiopia and Eritrea...The French noted that the possibility of social unrest existed in Djibouti, in part because income from the bases was not necessarily being distributed broadly...The widespread use of khat, a stimulant imported mainly from Ethiopia, was

a significant factor in Djiboutian society. It had generally negative effects on the political process and economy. Social unrest was always possible when supplies of khat dwindled...Increasing numbers of Somalis, Eritreans, and Ethiopians were in Djibouti, attracted by Djibouti’s port and the illusion that it would always provide more jobs, which was not the case. Ethnic tensions were growing in Djibouti...”

35. In a 16 September 2006 cable, “Ethiopia: Deputy Minister Tekeda Talks Somalia, Regional Issues with Das Yamamoto”, the Ethiopian Deputy Minister Tekeda Alemu tells the US official in Addis that he wants a break in Djibouti-Eritrea ties. The cable from US Ambassador Donald Yamamoto begins with this: “...Tekeda expressed concern about increasing Eritrean influence over Djibouti as well as CIC contacts with President Guellih. He encouraged the USG to speak frankly with Djibouti about the risks of its behavior... Tekeda maintained that the GOD was “on the wrong path,” and added that Djibouti was not strong enough to take Ethiopia’s continued friendship and forbearance for granted...”

36. But in February-March 2008, a putative Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute was deliberately escalated to advance the US-Ethiopia agenda against the State of Eritrea. The Government of Djibouti unleashed an intensive campaign accusing Eritrea of deploying forward troops in the common border. This was not contested by the French Government as the following cable illustrates: “...French Ambassador to Djibouti Dominique Decherf said that while he had to take note of the assertions by Djibouti’s Foreign Minister, French military observers in the field had not seen any concentration of Eritrean troops along the border with Djibouti. He said French fixed-wing aircraft dispatched to the area on April 17 “did not see anything conclusive,” and did not see massive troop concentrations along the border...”

37. On 12 May 2008, France’s position on the issue remained the same. A cable from the US Embassy in Paris reported the following: “...Le Gal said the Djiboutians had been phoning her “three times a day” and that her message to them was to avoid raising tensions in the region over an incident that had resolved itself peacefully. She repeated that, while Ethiopia’s border dispute with Eritrea was long-standing, there appeared to be no historical basis for a border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti, which was another reason that both sides should avoid turning this episode into a real problem...”

38. But while France offered

to mediate between Djibouti and Eritrea to resolve the issue, the United States took Djibouti’s side from the very first instance. And when Djibouti forces attacked Eritrean units on June 10, 2008, the US promptly condemned what it termed “Eritrean aggression” and pushed the UNSC to pass a resolution against Eritrea. US conduct in these affairs is again illustrated by the following WikiLeaks cables: “A 15 January 2009 cable shows the close coordination between the US and Djibouti and the agenda vis-a-vis Eritrea. ‘...Foreign Minister Mahmoud Youssouf called Ambassador on January 15 to express thanks for UNSCR 1862 regarding the Djibouti/Eritrea border dispute. Youssouf said the GODJ was pleased with the outcome. Ambassador responded that we, too, thought it was a strong resolution — one that had resulted from a collaborative effort, including close consultation with Djiboutian PermRep Roble Olhaye. Separately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs circulated the text of UNSCR 1862 via diplomatic note to all foreign missions in Djibouti, highlighting that “the Security Council placed responsibility for the aggression on Eritrea and demanded that it withdraw its troops from Ras Doumeira and Doumeira Island within five weeks.” Admitting it was unlikely that the GSE would respond positively to the resolution, the Foreign Minister commented that the GODJ must now begin to develop a strategy for “the next stage,” after the five-week deadline has elapsed. This is a point that Embassy Djibouti has made repeatedly over the past two months to senior GODJ contacts, including Youssouf, National Security Advisor Hassan Said Khaireh, and Presidency Secretary General Ismail Tani. Ambassador offered to work closely with Youssouf as the GODJ develops its strategy.”

US primary role in UNSC Resolutions 1907 and 2023 39. The United States was and remains the principal architect behind the punitive sanctions that the UN Security Council imposed against Eritrea in 2009 and 2011 respectively. In the words of the former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, the strategy pursued by the US Administration was to ‘pin down and punish Eritrea’ for refusing to give up the legal course. This fact is illustrated by, among other evidences, Wikileaks cables that are now in the public domain. 40. According to these cables, Ambassador Susan Rice was personally involved in the push for sanctions against Eritrea under the rust of Eritrea’s conduct of “regional destabilization”.

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ERITREA-SICHUAN MINERAL CONSTRUCTION CORP. LTD.

Vacancy Announcement

Eritrea-Sichuan Mineral Construction Corp LTD. (ESMC/ENFI) is inviting applicants for the following positions for Asmara Copper-Gold Polymetallic Project Site.

Position-01: HSE (Health Safety & Environment) Manager

Department: Processing Plant and Tailings Storage Facility

Number Required: 01

Contract Type: Definite (One Year)

Major Duties and Responsibilities

- ❖ The HSE Manager is responsible for the complete administration and organization of Health, Safety, Environment and Security management.
- ❖ He reports directly to the Project Manager. Specific responsibilities of the HSE Manager include:
 - ❖ Leading the management of HSE in the field.
 - ❖ Prepare the HSE program as per the Contract conditions and OWNER's HSE specifications.
 - ❖ State of HSE factors during execution of the contract to site HSE engineers, site management staff and also subcontractors
 - ❖ Comment to the HSE performance of subcontractors
 - ❖ Verify the bidding documents and proposals from qualified construction subcontractors
 - ❖ Supervise the execution of HSE program at site, and coordinating HSE works
 - ❖ Managing and administering of the site contracts to achieve safety, quality, budget and schedule objectives.
 - ❖ Assist commissioning manager to verify the HAZOP docs and joint inspect activities before testing and pre-commissioning works
 - ❖ Assist PM for dealing with Health and Environment issues

Qualification and Other Skills

Education:

- ❖ Bachelor Degree or Above

Work experience:

- ❖ Over 5 years of working experience in related fields.
- ❖ International EPC project, overseas project management experience is preferred.
- ❖ Relevant certificate is preferred
- ❖ Candidate who have the working experience in international companies will be preferred
- ❖ HSE Working Experience in Mineral Companies is preferred for this position

Additional skills and abilities:

- ❖ Excellent language expression skills
- ❖ Excellent communication, coordination and project management skills.
- ❖ Applicant who can speak good English and Chinese will be preferred.

- ❖ Have rich HSE management experience
- ❖ Have a good knowledge of engineering and technology Standards, Procedures and Specifications for HSE management

Position-02: HSE officer

Department: HSE

Number Required: 06

Contract Type: Definite (One Year)

Major Duties and Responsibilities

- ❖ Assist the Project Manager and Safety Director in establishing safety production assurance system, safety protection assurance system, mechanical equipment safety assurance system and occupational health and safety management.
- ❖ Correct all illegal command, illegal operation and unsafe state.
- ❖ Undertake two functions of management and inspection and supervision, publicize and implement the laws and regulations of the state and the superior competent department on safety production and leadership protection, and assist leaders in safety production management.
- ❖ Record, collect, sort out and keep the data of safety production regulations. Organize management personnel, team leaders and employees of the Project Department to hold various safety education training meetings.
- ❖ Make a safety account, record compliance and discipline and near miss accident investigation, collect safety technical disclosure and safety activity records, and accept safety facilities and mechanical equipment safety devices.

Qualification and Other Skills

Education:

- ❖ Bachelor's degree in safety engineering and related major.

Work experience:

- ❖ Engaged in safety management for more than 3 years.
- ❖ Relevant certificate is preferred.
- ❖ Excellent English & Chinese or English & Eritrean.

Additional skills and abilities:

- ❖ Familiar with relevant national and local safety regulations and policies.
- ❖ Knowledge of metal and non-metal mining industry.
- ❖ Be familiar with the company's safety management system and relevant knowledge of the company's business process.
- ❖ Rigorous, serious and meticulous character .
- ❖ Good judgment skills and crisis management skills.
- ❖ Strong sense of responsibility.
- ❖ Have a very good sense of teamwork.

Interview with President Isaias Afwerki

Continued from page 3

It chose to stand by the people as it knew their aspirations and wishes. Also because it is a product of the people. The role it played in those crucial times cannot be underrated. For this reason, it possessed all the credentials to shoulder the burden of transition. These considerations prompted us to initiate our engagement and maintain continuous consultations with the Sovereign Council. Obviously, they know their case better. Nonetheless, we maintained constant discussions and shared our views in order to contribute what we can. In this spirit, we also put forward our proposal which cannot be fully discussed here for paucity of time. As I stated earlier, the historical contexts and trajectories are taken into account to draw appropriate lessons from the past.

Nation-building process invariably encompasses different aspects - of peoples, of citizenship, of opportunities. Even if we look at the experiences of others, the reference points are clear. The trajectory involves a transitional phase to catalyze a cogent climate for a new, viable, 7 and sustainable political dispensation that allows and guarantees the Sudanese people to ultimately make their choice. With this in mind, our proposal clarifies the strategic vision, from our perspective, for the transitional phase and beyond.

Obviously, there may be several initiatives from different quarters. For our part, we are

not really interested in competing in a bazaar. We will not be prompted to start an initiative in a competitive spirit. Our focus is on what we can really contribute; without publicity and in a very discreet mode. We have been working along these lines for the past four years. This is squarely based on partnership, understanding, and mutual respect; not our presumptuous preferences. And of course, it is based on listening to the opinion of others.

It is always counterproductive to try and “analyze” and “solve” issues after they have flared up. For this reason, we have been in constant communication, before the conflict erupted, with the stakeholders and providing our views and suggestions in a timely manner. In this context, we explained that the merging of the forces and the establishment of a sovereign army in Sudan is not a controversial topic in and of itself. But its implementation has its own dynamics or process. Obviously, the doctrine, configuration, capabilities, composition, size, and other fundamental military parameters are also part and parcel of the institutional building of a unitary army,

Unfortunately, the journey of the past 30 years has completely hampered this process. In addition to this, as mentioned earlier, armed forces were established that are outside the arena of the national army. Taking all of these factors into account, it is counterproductive to place the issue of the merging of all forces and the building of a



unified army as a precondition. This would only hinder the political transition process. In this spirit, we had indeed made our opinion clear; that this issue should not be used as an excuse to trigger any conflict.

We did not publicize it, but we had made our position clear to all the stakeholders. We persisted in our consistent engagement and exerted all necessary efforts to avert the eruption of any potential conflict. Still, we will continue to engage to bring restoration to the process that has been derailed. Our engagement cannot be erratic that is interrupted or abandoned when the conditions are not conducive. It is an obligation – not a choice.

Indeed, as far as we are concerned, the Sudan is unlike any other neighbor. Our relationship bears unique historical characteristics. As such, whether for the short-term or for the future, we are committed to a judicious engagement, and this goal is not something we can postpone.

What is disconcerting is the trend that we see and that may further exacerbate the situation. The war must stop. Disinformation that aggravates the situation must also cease.

Editor's Note: The second and final part of the Interview with President Isaias Afwerki will be published in our next edition.

Vacancy Announcement

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Position-03: HR Officer
Department: Processing Plant and Tailings Storage Facility
Number Required: 03
Contract Type: Definite (One Year)

Major Duties and Responsibilities

- ❖ Responsible for the specific implementation of the routine work in the recruitment, salary, performance, training, labor relations and other aspects of local personnel.
- ❖ Assist in developing and improving internal system and operation process.
- ❖ Collect the resource information of the local workers and manage the local workers.
- ❖ Responsible for the visa of Chinese personnel and other related matters.
- ❖ Complete other tasks assigned by the superior leaders.

Qualification and Other Skills

Education:

- ❖ Bachelor's degree in human resources management or labor and social security.

Work experience:

- ❖ Holding relevant certificates or professional titles.
- ❖ Familiar with relevant Chinese and Eritrean standards.
- ❖ Proficient in written and spoken Chinese and English.
- ❖ Over 2 years of HR management or related work.

Additional skills and abilities:

- ❖ Rigorous, serious and meticulous character.
- ❖ Strong sense of responsibility and hard-working.
- ❖ Good judgment skills and crisis management skills.
- ❖ Practical□positive in the work.
- ❖ Have Personnel management and leadership skills.
- ❖ Have the knowledge of the local human resources market and government-related labor law policies.

Position-04: Secretary
Department: Processing Plant and Tailings Storage Facility
Number Required: 03
Contract Type: Definite (One Year)

Major Duties and Responsibilities

- ❖ Assist management personnel in managing the local relationships with all related departments
- ❖ Participate in communication meetings with local managers, owners and government agencies
- ❖ Assist with the management team for local affairs
- ❖ Preparation and following up documents (including but not limited to custom clearance documents, construction documents, letters etc.)
- ❖ Control the incoming and outgoing letters, drawings and other documents
- ❖ Assist the office works
- ❖ Liaising with local government organs.
- ❖ Other works assigned by management staff
- ❖ Assist to translate or interpret from Eritrean into English or vice versa.

Qualification and Other Skills

Education:

- ❖ Bachelor's degree or above

Work experience:

- ❖ Above 3 years of coordination and secretary experience
- ❖ Working experience in Mineral companies is preferred

Additional skills and abilities:

- ❖ Excellent language expression skills
- ❖ Excellent communication, coordination and project management skills
- ❖ English speaking is necessary for this position
- ❖ Microsoft software skill is necessary for this position

Chronology of unfriendly policies . . .

Continued from page 5

• The cable, “UGANDA TO CONSIDER ERITREA SANCTIONS RESOLUTION WHICH COVERS DJIBOUTI; REMAINS COMMITTED TO AMISOM”, details a conversation Susan Rice had on 20 September 2009 with Yoweri Museveni, the President of Uganda: “...Rice emphasized that the U.S. strongly supports a resolution addressing the issue of Eritrea invading Djibouti. It is a matter of principle that the U.S. cannot ignore, which puts UNSC credibility at stake, and would make Eritrea feel it can continue to invade neighbors with impunity, she said. Museveni expressed concern that references to both Somalia and Djibouti in the draft UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions resolution might jeopardize its adoption chances. Rice said that she believes there is only one chance to secure a resolution, so Djibouti must be included, and noted that the international community has never effectively confronted Eritrea for invading neighboring countries on five occasions (Yemen, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia). She noted that in January, the UNSC gave Eritrea a deadline of six weeks to leave Djibouti or face sanctions...”

41. Rice was not interested in providing evidence to support her allegations against Eritrea and her remarks about the members of the UN Security Council shows her that she was willing to deceive the Council to advance her agenda: “... Rice reminded Museveni that past experience suggested that the UNSC would not block a resolution led by African members and supported by the African Union. She shared the U.S. read that, if Burkina Faso and Uganda co-sponsor this resolution, the British will support, the French will “keep their heads down” and will not block. FM Kutesa noted that Uganda had no substantive concerns over including Djibouti in the resolution. His concern, he said, was that because the AU had never passed an actual resolution that included Djibouti, the Russian and Chinese delegations would have to consult with their capitals before agreeing to it. Rice advised Kutesa not to be overly cautious, and reasserted that a resolution perceived to be African-led would not fail. She noted that, if it became clear during consultations that Russia and China had insurmountable concerns about including Djibouti, they could be dealt with before the issue came to vote...”

1. Persisten Smear Campaigns

42. The US State Department has been obsessed, especially in the last ten years, with demonizing Eritrea and its Government. The annual human rights report is invariably replete with gross distortion of facts and events.

43. The US State Department put Eritrea as a “Country of particular concern” on religious freedom purely for political reasons. Eritrea is a secular State where all religions are respected and where Christianity and Islam have co-existed in harmony for over 1400 years. The false charges of religious persecution were vigorously pursued for other ulterior motives. There are new and fringe groups, whose membership does not exceed a couple of hundreds, and who receive financing from abroad. These groups were asked to register in accordance with the laws of the country and to declare their income.

44. The controversy over diplomatic pouches has also been blown out of proportion. The two incidents arose when there were grounds to believe that the external markings of large crates that the US embassy was bringing as “diplomatic pouches” were at variance with the contents. The containers were not however detained. The Embassy was requested to allow the Customs officials to open the containers in the presence of US Embassy personnel. When this was not granted, the Embassy was asked to take back the containers. This happened only on two occasions. The US Embassy has otherwise enjoyed unfettered access to bring hundreds of these containers. The US Embassy is in fact operating a relaying radio station from within the Embassy premises without notifying the Government of Eritrea or requesting operational permission for the equipment as expressly stipulated in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

45. The decision to close the Eritrean Consulate in Oakland cannot be interpreted as “reciprocal action”. In the first place, US authorities have all along taken various measures against the Eritrean Embassy in Washington, including unlawful seizure of money and documents. The Government of Eritrea never took reciprocal action. The travel restrictions that Eritrea introduced recently in view of the prevailing tense situation with Ethiopia did not also single out the US Embassy. Temporary measures of this nature are indeed normative practices that States routinely take. The explanations of the Assistant Secretary of State cannot, therefore, be convincing. There are not, also, “400 Americans in Eritrea whose right of Consular protection has been adversely affected by this measure”.

46. The charges of “sponsoring terrorism” and “destabilizing the region” are utterly baseless allegations that belie the ulterior motives of the US State Department. Eritrea’s position on Somalia has been spelled out unequivocally in various occasions and forums before; including at the IGAD and UN sessions. Equating Somalia’s quest for national reconstitution after

16 years of mayhem with “Islamist terrorism” is either inexcusable ignorance or deliberate distortion of facts and events. As Eritrea has underlined repeatedly, the presumed presence of one or two alleged international terrorists cannot justify, by any stretch of imagination, the invasion of a sovereign country; and, the deaths of tens of thousands and the displacement of almost half a million civilians.

47. The charge of regional destabilization is equally preposterous. Ethiopia invaded Somalia in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions which were adjusted to “fit the new reality” because of US support. Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia was long planned with the tacit encouragement and joint planning of the respective US agencies. Ethiopia is violating international law to occupy sovereign Eritrean territories and to spawn a permanent situation of regional tension and instability.

48. In the same vein, Eritrea’s constructive role in the Sudan cannot be saluted as “positive influence for the wrong reasons”. True, Eritrea in cooperation with Uganda and Ethiopia, pursued a policy of containment against the Sudan in the 1990s when Khartoum was flirting with terrorism and when Bin Laden had his headquarters there. The United States was, at least nominally, supportive of what it called the “Frontline States” in those times. Apparently, the US Assistant Secretary of State has not checked, or has deliberately chosen to ignore, the well-known positions of her government in the recent past.

49. Furthermore, the United States has been feverishly working, especially in the last ten years, to isolate Eritrea and to undermine the flow of investment and economic cooperation from Europe and the Middle East in particular. The following cables illustrate the scope and extent of this campaigns.

50. According to a 29 May 2009 cable, A/S CARTER’S APRIL 23 MEETING WITH BELGIAN MFA AFRICA TEAM, at a breakfast on 23 April 2009 for visiting Acting A/S for African Affairs Phillip Carter and NSC Senior Director for Africa Michelle Gavin with the Belgian MFA Africa Team, Phillip Carter repeated his accusations against Eritrea and questioned EU’s assistance to Eritrea. “...Carter also asked about the EU’s large grant to the regime in Eritrea.... Carter hoped the international community would support AU calls for sanctions. He also questioned the wisdom of giving EUR 122 million to a regionally-destabilizing pariah regime in Eritrea...”

51. In his conversation with

Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia on 19 November 2009, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Karl Wycoff divulges US campaign to isolate Eritrea. “... Wycoff agreed there is no evidence that Eritrea has showed improvement in its behavior, although he added that President Isaias had recently undertaken something of a charm offensive targeted at European diplomats, a possible indication that he may be considering options. Wycoff assured Meles that the U.S. remains committed to achieving a UNSC sanctions regime against Asmara and continues to broaden the discussion beyond the P3 and Uganda with a hard push by USUN. He said the USG was also expanding efforts to undercut support for Asmara, noting for example he been sent on a trip to Cairo, Riyadh, Jeddah and other cities both to promote efforts to undercut flows of support to Asmara but also to seek concrete support for Somalia’s TFG. He said he has observed that some EU member states, formerly more supportive of Eritrea, have come to accept that Eritrea is playing a seriously negative role in the region and that the UK now believes that Eritrea has become a significant threat to its own domestic security...”

52. As a continuation of unprovoked hostilities against Eritrea, Susan Rice was at the forefront lobbying and arm twisting the Geneva-based Human Rights Council to adopt a country-specific special mandate and appoint a Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Eritrea in July of 2012. To this end Djibouti, Nigeria and Somalia (non-member of the Council) were handed a script to sponsor the resolution.

53. Again in 2014, the US was a lead lobbyist in the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea.

54. In 2014, according to Herman Cohen, former Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, fourteen members of the UN Security Council were contemplating lifting the sanctions against Eritrea. Susan Rice threatened to veto any resolution towards that end.

55. In June 2016, as the UN Human Rights Council Session was going on in Geneva, the US encouraged the Ethiopian government to invade Eritrea. Fortunately, the attempt was crushed.

56. In October 2016, Eritrea’s Presidential advisor’s speech at the Atlantic Council was canceled due to White House coercion on the organizers.

57. In October 2016, a public meeting of Eritrean Americans with Eritrea’s High-Level Delegation visiting Washington, DC was canceled due to pressure from the Administration.

58. On 13 September 2017, Nick Turse maintained, in an article

entitled “How the NSA built a secret Surveillance Network for Ethiopia” that the US was involved with an eavesdropping project called “Lion’s Pride” to help the minority government in Ethiopia spy not only on its people but its neighboring countries as well. The relevant paragraph reads: “...according to classified U.S. documents published Wednesday by The Intercept, the National Security Agency forged a relationship with the Ethiopian government that has expanded exponentially over the years. What began as one small facility soon grew into a network of clandestine eavesdropping outposts designed to listen in on the communications of Ethiopians and their neighbors across the Horn of Africa in the name of counterterrorism...”

59. The United States continues to place Eritrea on its list of “Countries of Particular Concern” in its annual Religious Freedom reports.

60. Every year around the month of May, the US administration continues to issue negative travel warnings regardless of the prevailing situation in Eritrea.

61. On Sept 25, 2012, at the Clinton Global Initiative, President Obama stated the following: “I recently renewed sanctions on some of the worst abusers, including North Korea and Eritrea. We’re partnering with groups that help women and children escape from the grip of their abusers. We’re helping other countries step up their own efforts.

62. The Obama administration invited nearly all of Africa’s leaders to the US-Africa Leaders Summit. President Isaias Afwerki was left out on instructions from Susan Rice.

1.	Reasons	Behind
Misguided	US	Hostility

63. The spiral of hostility that characterizes US policy towards Eritrea boils down to one overriding reason. This was true in the 1950s and it is also true in present times. This has nothing to do with principles of international law or with values of justice, democracy and human rights. The United States has all along believed that its perceived strategies in the region can be better served by Ethiopia; irrespective of the philosophical persuasions of the regime in power in Addis Ababa. This consistent and overriding policy was couched in Cold War terms in the 1950s. It was subsequently articulated in terms of regional “Anchor States” as spelled out in the US National Security Strategy of 2002.

64. This policy did not serve the interests of Eritrea, Ethiopia, the region, and even the United States. Yet, it continued for six decades with damaging consequences. Eritrea hopes that now, it can be finally redressed contributing to regional peace and security and promoting US interests.